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Introduction
A federal state, or a federation, is one in which political power is shared among central or national authority and a number of sub-national authorities, generally under the terms of a constitution (Roberts, 1999) . In a federation, definite powers are allotted to the central government, and the actions of the central government in exercising the powers conferred on it by the constitution may directly and/or indirectly affect the sub-national governments and vice versa.
Fiscal policy refers to that part of government policy concerning the raising of revenue through taxation and other means, and deciding on the level and pattern of expenditure for the purpose of influencing economic activities or attaining specified desired macroeconomic objectives (Anyanwu, 1997) . Fiscal policy has at least three broad aspects, namely stabilization, distribution and allocation. Stabilization aspects relate to managing unemployment, inflation and economic development in general. Distribution aspects relate to changes in the distribution of income through spending and taxing policy. Allocation aspects deal with the provision of goods and services efficiently and effectively. In a federation, the stabilization and distribution aspects of fiscal policy normally belong to the central government, whereas the allocation function is performed by jurisdictions defined as benefit areas, which may be local, regional or national in scope (Musgrave and Musgrave, 1976: 625) . In other words, while the stabilization and distribution aspects of fiscal policy are generally reserved for the federal government, the allocation aspects are within the purview of all levels of government.
Meanwhile, regardless of the purpose, in determining fiscal policy, a government has to decide various things, including how much to raise through taxes, how much to allocate to recurrent expenditure (personnel and overhead costs) and how much to allocate to capital expenditure on items such as schools, hospitals, housing construction, road construction and so on. Also, regardless of the level, a government may choose to spend more than it raises as revenue and so run a budget deficit. If the deficit is financed by printing money, then there is the risk of inflation. Needless to say, an important indicator of macroeconomic instability is rising inflation. Also, if interest rates are rising, this may adversely affect production activities, leading to unemployment. Clearly, rising unemployment is another key indicator of macroeconomic instability. An economy that is confronted with rising inflation and unemployment is unlikely to secure decent economic growth and transformation, both of which are required for economic development (NISER, 2000) . This is precisely why the fiscal policy actions of a government in a federation can threaten macroeconomic stability, which is normally the primary preoccupation of the central government.
Therefore, fiscal policy coordination is imperative in a federal state if fiscal policy is to be able to secure macroeconomic stability. In this respect, fiscal policy coordination in a federation such as Nigeria will require adherence to fiscal discipline (observing the fiscal deficit rule similar to that currently in place in the Eurozone) by federal and state governments as well as adherence to the strategies for dealing with other externalities that cannot be addressed through fiscal discipline alone. See Pisani-Ferry (2002) for a discussion of fiscal policy discipline and policy coordination in the Eurozone. In the Nigerian context, the 1999 Constitution already grants full autonomy to state governments with respect to powers and the control of public funds (Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999: Sections 120-9) . In the absence of a fiscal policy rule to which all levels of government can adhere, that component of fiscal policy coordination is blunted. At the same time, there are no strategies for dealing with other externalities, such as unanticipated upsurge or decline in revenues whose rates and/or bases cannot be significantly influenced by the Nigerian authorities at the federal and/or state level. Moreover, as will be seen later, all levels of government depend excessively on oil for revenue. The major determinants of oil revenue, namely quantity and price of oil export, are really exogenously determined by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), the oil-producing companies and oil importers. With a relatively small proportion of government revenue coming from internal sources, fiscal policy coordination can be secured mainly through expenditure management.
Meanwhile, the state governments, relishing constitutionally guaranteed autonomy, are unwilling to voluntarily surrender to the tenets of fiscal responsibility, namely adherence to a reasonable fiscal deficit rule and strategies for dealing with exogenous revenue shocks. This is particularly so as the Constitution also guarantees the rights of state governments to their portion of the Federation Account proceeds. The Federation Account receives all federally collected revenue with the exception of personal income tax from the personnel of the armed forces, the Nigeria Police, Foreign Affairs and the residents of the Federal Capital Territory. These revenues are retained by the federal government. Clearly, fiscal policy coordination in Nigeria can only occur accidentally. Fortuitous fiscal policy coordination in a federation does not augur well, for fiscal policy is unlikely to be an effective tool of stabilization, distribution and allocation, all of which are necessary ingredients for sustainable growth and development.
Against this background, it is necessary to examine strategies for securing fiscal policy coordination in the Nigerian Federation, especially since 1999 when the new constitution came into effect and democratic governance resumed. Accordingly, the rest of the chapter is structured as follows. In the next section, threats
